A conference key protocol allows a group of participants to establish a secret communication (conference) key so that all their communications thereafter are protected by the key. In this paper we consider the distributed conference key (conference key agreement) protocol. We present two round-efficient conference key agreement protocols, which achieve the optimum in terms of the number of rounds. Our protocols are secure against both passive and active adversaries under the random oracle model. They release no useful information to passive adversaries and achieve fault tolerance against any coalition of malicious participants. We achieve the optimal round by transferring an interactive proof system to a non-interactive version, while preserving its security capability.
Introduction
A conference key protocol allows a group of participants to establish a secret communication (conference) key so that all their communications thereafter are protected by the key. In this paper we consider the distributed conference key (conference key agreement) protocol under the broadcast channel model in which sent messages are guaranteed to be received intact. Nevertheless, the attacker can inject false messages.
For security, we consider both active and passive adversaries. A passive adversary, eavesdropper, tries to learn information by listening to the communication of the participants. There are two types of active adversaries: impersonators and malicious participants. An impersonator tries to impersonate as a legal participant. A malicious participant tries to disrupt conference key establishment among honest participants.
Our protocols focus on round efficiency. We would like to have a conference key agreement protocol by which the participants exchange messages with as few rounds as possible even when active adversaries are present. In this paper we present two round-efficient conference key agreement protocols that achieve the optimum in terms of the number of rounds, that is, they use only one round even in the worst scenario. After each participant sends messages to and receives messages from other participants, they go on to compute the conference key no matter whether the attack of active adversaries occurs. Our protocols are secure against both passive and active adversaries under the random oracle model. They release no useful information to passive adversaries and achieve fault tolerance against any coalition of malicious participants. We achieve the optimal round by transferring an interactive proof system to a non-interactive version, while preserving its security capability.
Related Work
Computing a conference key among a set of participants is a special case of secure multiparty computation in which a group of people, who each possesses a private input k i , computes a function f (k 1 , k 2 , · · · ) securely [2] . Therefore, it is possible to have a secure conference key agreement protocol by the generic construction for secure multiparty computation. Nevertheless, it is an overkill. Furthermore, there are some distinct features for the conference key agreement protocol. First, a cheater's goal in conference key agreement is to disrupt conference key establishment among the set of honest participants, which is quite different from that in secure multiparty computation. Second, since a cheater's secret is not a necessity in conference key agreement, the cheater can be simply excluded when detected. On the other hand, in secure multiparty computation when a cheater is found, the cheater's secret x i , which is shared into others, is recovered by honest participants so that evaluation can proceed.
There have been intensive research on conference key protocols. Conference key distribution protocols (with a chairman) have been studied in [3, 9, 10, 19] . Pre-distributed conference key protocols have been studied in [4, 5, 22] . And conference key agreement protocols have been studied in [17, 19, 20, 27, 29, 28] . Information-theoretically secure conference key protocols have been studied in [5, 12] . Most proposed protocols except [18, 28] do not have the capability of fault-tolerance so that a malicious participant can easily mislead other participants to compute different conference keys so that the honest participants cannot confer correctly.
Burmester and Desmedt [7] proposed a round-efficient (two-round) protocol (Protocol 3) with f (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n ) = g k1k2+k2k3+···+knk1 mod p. In the modified Protocol 7 (authenticated key distribution), they used an interactive proof for authenticating sent messages to show that the protocol is secure against impersonators. However, both protocols cannot withstand the attack of malicious participants. The fault-tolerant conference key agreement protocol of Klein et al. [18] is quite inefficient and its security is not rigidly proved. In [28] , when malicious participants are detected, the protocol restarts for the remained participants. It can may be that a participant behaves maliciously in a new round and thus the protocol has to restart again. So, the protocols have to run O(m) times for m malicious participants in the worst case. This may be inefficient since the number of rounds may entail main communication cost,
Preliminaries
A user in a conference key system is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. Each user U i has a secret key x i and a corresponding public key y i . The system has a public directory of recording the system's public parameters and each user's public key that can be accessed by every one. All users are connected by a broadcast network such that the messages sent on the network cannot be altered, blocked or delayed. For simplicity, we assume that the network is synchronous, that is, for a given phase of a round, all users send their messages to other recipients (or receive messages from others senders) simultaneously. No private channel exists between users. A group of users who wants to establish a conference key is called the set of participants.
We consider three types of adversaries. They are all probabilistic polynomialtime Turing machines. An eavesdropper, who is not a participant, listens to the broadcast channel and tries to learn the conference key established by the honest participants. An impersonator, who is an outsider, tries to impersonate as a legal participant. A malicious participant, who is a participant, tries to disrupt establishment of a common conference key among the honest participants. A malicious participant mainly sends "malicious" messages to fool an honest participant to believe that he has computed the same conference key as that of other honest participants, while he does not indeed. We do not care about the possibility that two or more cheating participants collaborate and result in one of them or other malicious participants not being able to compute the key. For example, a malicious participant U i sends "malicious" messages, but all honest participants compute the same key. Another malicious participant U j , though receiving an incorrect key, still claims that he has had received the correct key. We tolerate this case since this type of collaboration between malicious U i and U j do no harm to the honest participants. We do not restrict the number of malicious participants in a conference.
A conference key agreement protocol should meet the following requirements:
-Authentication: an outsider cannot impersonate as a legal participant.
-Correctness: the set of honest participants who follow the protocol computes a common conference key. -Fairness: the conference key should be determined unbiasedly by all honest participants together. -Fault tolerance: no coalition of malicious participants can spoil the conference by making honest participants compute different conference keys. -Privacy: an eavesdropper can not get any information about the conference key established by the honest participants.
We consider two types of communication cost:
-Message efficiency: the total number of messages sent by the participants for completing the protocol. This includes the extra messages for dealing with malicious participants.
-Round efficiency: the total number of rounds executed by the participant for completing the protocol. This includes the extra rounds for dealing with the malicious participants.
In security analysis we use the random oracle model [1] , which assumes that a cryptographically strong (collision-free) hash function is a random function. Although this is only a security argument [8] , it is a suitable paradigm for analyzing our first protocol.
Basic Techniques
We use the following setting for the system and users throughout the rest of the paper. The system has public parameters:
-p: a large prime number that is 2q + 1, where q is a large prime also.
-g: a generator for the subgroup G q of all quadratic residues in Z * p . Each user U i has two parameters:
Since q is a prime number, y i is a generator for G q .
Let x ∈ R S denote that x is chosen from the set S uniformly and independently and [a..b] denote the set of numbers in between a and b, where a ≤ b. In order to simplify presentation, we omit the or complexity measure n from the related parameters, unless necessary. For example, when we say a probability is negligible, we mean that for any positive constant c, = (n) < 1/n c for large enough n. A probability δ is overwhelming if δ = 1 − for some negligible probability .
The discrete logarithm (DL) problem is to compute x ≡ log g y (mod p) from given (y, g, p), where p = 2q + 1, g is a generator of G q and y ∈ R G q . The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to distinguish the distributions
with a non-negligible probability, where g 1 and g 2 are generators of G q , r ∈ R Z q and u 1 , u 2 ∈ R G q . We assume that the DL and DDH problems are computationally infeasible. They are called the DL assumption (DLA) and the DDH assumption (DDHA). In particular, any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm cannot solve even a non-negligible fraction of input of the DL problem.
The main building block of our conference key agreement protocols is a protocol of sending a (random) secret to the other participants such that any one can verify that all participants receive the same secret. We call this as the protocol for a publicly verifiable secret (PVS). Let t be the security parameter of the system. If participant U i wants to send the secret (subkey) g ki mod p to all other participants in a publicly verifiable way, it broadcasts
with error probability 1/2 t . We can make the error probability inverse exponentially small by repeating the system for a polynomial number of times. The PVS proof system is: Proof. The completeness property can be verified easily. For soundness, if a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can impersonate P with a nonnegligible probability , the verifier V and A together can solve the discrete logarithm problem with an overwhelming probability. Since the probability is non-negligible, one can use A to generate two responses w 1 = r − c 1 k i mod q and w 2 = r − c 2 k i mod q for the same commitment b j 's and two different challenges c 1 and c 2 . One can compute U i 's secret key k i = (w 1 − w 2 )(c 2 − c 1 ) −1 mod q. Furthermore, if the prover does not know k i , he can pass a challenge by the verifier V with the probability of 1/2 t . To simulate the view of a verifier V * , the simulator S first selects c ∈ R [0..2 t −1] and w ∈ R Z q and computes 
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We need the proof system to be non-interactive. By the standard technique [14] , we replace V with a cryptographically strong (collision-resistant) hash function H for generating the challenge c. In the non-interactive paradigm, the interactive version of a proof system need only be zero-knowledge for the honest verifier. Our PVS proof system is honest-verifier zero-knowledge even when c ∈ Z q . Therefore, we choose H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} log q . The message (c, w) sent by U i for non-interactive PVS satisfies , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) to denote the non-interactive proof system described above. By verifying log y1 u i,1 ≡ log y2 u i,2 ≡ · · · ≡ log yn u i,n , one can be assured that all participants receive the same secret value g ki . The proof system releases no useful information assuming the DLA and the random oracle model.
The integral APVS (PVS with authentication) proof system achieves public verification of a secret and authentication of an identity simultaneously. For APVS, the participant U i broadcasts
to other participants, where k i ∈ R Z q . Given the broadcast messages, the APVS proof system is to show that
The APVS proof system with input (g, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) is: then S outputs (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n , c, w 1 , w 2 ) . Otherwise, S resets V * to its original state before this round of simulation. We can see that the output of S and V * 's view with P are statistically indistinguishable.
Again, we can make the proof system non-interactive by using a cryptographically strong hash function H in place of V . Let NIAPVS (g, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) = (w 1 , w 2 , c) denote the non-interactive APVS proof system such that
where c, w 1 , w 2 ∈ R Z q . We now present two proofs for the Diffie-Hellman and equality properties, respectively. The proof system DH for the Diffie-Hellman property is to show that an input has the form (g, u, v, z)=(g, g a , g b , g ab ) and the prover knows a and b. The proof system EQ for the equality property is to show that an input has the form (g, u, y, v)=(g, g a , y, y a ) and the prover knows a.
The DH proof system is as follows. The EQ proof system is:
Theorem 4.
The EQ proof system is complete, sound and zero-knowledge [11] .
We use NIDH and NIEQ to denote the non-interactive versions of the DH and EQ proof systems, respectively.
Our Round-Efficient Protocols
We present two round-efficient conference key protocols and show their security. The first one uses the PVS protocol for verifying the sender's subkey and digital signature for sender's identity. The second protocol uses the integral APVS for both subkey verification and identity authentication.
Since our protocols are non-interactive, we need use a session token ST, which is new for each conference session, in the hash functions to prevent the replay attack. Thus, in our protocols each collision-free hash function H(·) is computed as H(ST, ·).
Protocol Conf-1
The protocol starts with that an initiator calls for a conference for a set U of participants and sets the session token ST. Without loss of generality, let U = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } be the initial participant set. Each participant U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, knows U. Let H be a collision-resistant hashing function, which is used in the modified ElGamal signature scheme. In the protocol, each participant U i first selects a random number k i and computes his subkey g ki mod p. This subkey is conveyed to the other participants by sending sends NIPVS(g, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) for convincing other participants that all other participants receive the same subkey. U i also sends the signature (r i , s i ) of his subkey for authentication. After receiving messages from other participants, U i checks whether the participant U j , j = i, sends the correct messages and authenticates U j 's identity. If not, U i excludes U j from the set of honest participants. Then, U i computes the conference key according to the set of honest participants. Our protocol is as follows.
1. Message sending: each participant U i does the following: 
Note that only legal participants can verify whether (r i , s i ) is the signature of the subkey z i . This property is crucial to the proof of releasing no useful information in the random oracle model.
Security Analysis of Conf-1
We now show security of protocol Conf-1 on authentication, correctness, fairness, fault tolerance against malicious participants, and releasing no useful information.
We first show that all honest participants who follow the protocol compute the same conference key. The conference key is determined by all honest participant unbiasedly. Fault tolerance, correctness and fairness) . All honest participants who follow the protocol compute a common conference key with an overwhelming probability no matter how many participants are malicious. Furthermore, the common conference key is determined by the honest participants unbiasedly.
Theorem 5 (
Proof. For fault tolerance, we show two things. First, any malicious participant U i who tries to cheat another participant U j to accept a different subkey will be excluded by all honest participants. Second, any honest participant will not be excluded by any other honest participant.
Since we assume the broadcast channel, every participant receives the same messages. If a malicious participant U i sends (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) such that not all log yj u i,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are equal, the probability that he can construct NIPVS (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i,n ) is at most T /q, which is negligible, where T is U i 's runtime. Thus, all honest participants will exclude the malicious participant with an overwhelming probability. We can easily check that an honest participant who follows the protocol shall be accepted by other honest participants as "honest". Therefore, each honest participant computes the same honest participant set with an overwhelming probability.
For correctness, since each honest participant U i computes the same participant set, U i uses his private key x i to compute the subkeys z j = g kj mod p of all honest participants. Thus, they compute the same conference key with an overwhelming probability.
For fairness, since the common conference key is g k1+k2+···+kn mod p, it is unbiased if any of k i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is selected over Z q uniformly and independently. Therefore, no participants can bias the conference key as long as one of the honest participants behaves properly.
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In our protocol, we let each participant sign his broadcast subkey by the modified ElGamal signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable against the chosen ciphertext attack under the random oracle model [23] . No outsider can impersonate as a legal participant with a non-negligible probability under the chosen-ciphertext attack in the random oracle model.
Theorem 6 (Authentication). Assume the random oracle model. If an outsider
A can impersonate as a legal participant U i to V with a non-negligible probability, A and V together can extract U i 's secret x i from A with an overwhelming probability.
Proof. Since the modified ElGamal signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under the chosen ciphertext attack, successful impersonation in the interactive system with a non-negligible probability would lead to computing U i 's secret x i with an overwhelming probability. The use of session token ST makes our non-interactive protocol secure against the replay attack. Note that without special care, the replay attack is inevitable in non-interactive systems. Therefore, our protocol is authenticated under the random oracle model.
Since we replace the verifier's challenge with a cryptographically strong hash function, the protocol is not zero-knowledge. But, it releases no useful information that can be used in the protocol under the random oracle model.
Theorem 7 (No useful information leakage).
Assume the DLA and the random oracle model. Protocol Conf-1 releases no useful information that can be used in the protocol.
Proof. Even though the PVS protocol is complete, sound and honest verifier zero-knowledge, we cannot claim that our protocol release no useful information directly since U i sends a signature (r i , s i ) in addition. The simulator S should handle this case. To simulate U i 's output, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S selects k i ∈ Z q randomly and computes u i,j = y ki j mod p, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and NIPVS(g, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , u i,1 , u i,2 , . . . , u i, 
Protocol Conf-2
In this protocol, identity authentication is achieved by NIAPVS. The protocol is as follows.
Security Analysis of Conf-2
The security analysis of NIAPVS-based Conf-2 is similar to that of NIPVSbased Conf-1. 
A Message-Efficient Protocol
The main protocol in [7] is message-efficient. If all the participants are honest, they broadcast O(n) messages totally. But, the protocol is not fault tolerant, that is, it cannot withstand the attack of malicious participants. We can apply the technique of publicly verifiable secrets to obtain a message-efficient, but not round-efficient, conference key agreement protocol that meets the security requirements. The protocols's message complexity is O(n) in the best case and O(n 2 ) in the worst case. It seems that there is no easy way to augment the protocol to be both message-and round-efficient. The modified protocol is as follows. Proof. The correctness follows from [7] , while the security follows from the previous two round-efficient conference key agreement protocols.
6 Conclusion
We have presented two round-efficient conference key agreement protocols. The protocols meet the security requirements: authentication, correctness, fairness, fault tolerance (robustness) and privacy. Their message complexity is O(n 2 ) for n participants. We also modified Burmester and Desmedt's protocol so that it can withstand the attack of malicious participants.
It would be interesting to find a round-efficient protocol that meets all security requirements and has O(n) message complexity.
